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DIGITAL DEMOCRACY: ANDERSON V. BELL & THE EXPANSION
OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN ELECTION LAW
Barry G. Stratford*
Technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand
what they do not manage and those who manage what they do not
understand.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The law has long recognized electronic signatures as legally effective where
hand-signed signatures are required. As early as 1869, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of a contract accepted by telegraph. 2
The court made observations about the application of technology to law that proves
insightful even today:
[I]t makes no difference whether [the telegraph] operator writes the offer
or the acceptance in the presence of his principal and by his express
direction, with a steel pen an inch long attached to an ordinary penholder,
or whether his pen be a copper wire a thousand miles long. In either case
the thought is communicated to the paper by the use of the finger resting
upon the pen; nor does it make any difference that in one case common
record ink is used, while in the other case a more subtle fluid, known as
electricity, performs the same office.3
Over the past decade, electronic signatures 4 have become increasingly
accepted under the laws of most jurisdictions. For example, in 2000, the United
States Congress enacted legislation ensuring the validity of transactions and
* © 2013 Barry G. Stratford, Executive Editor, UTAH ONLAW: THE UTAH LAW
REVIEW ONLINE SUPPLEMENT; J.D., University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law,
2012; M.P.P., University of Utah, 2009; Law Clerk for the Honorable Carolyn B. McHugh,
Presiding Judge, Utah Court of Appeals, 2012–2013. This Note was prepared by the author
in his personal capacity and the opinions expressed herein are the author’s own and do not
reflect the view of Judge McHugh, the Utah Court of Appeals, or the State of Utah.
1
ARCHIBALD PUTT, PUTT’S LAW AND THE SUCCESSFUL TECHNOCRAT: HOW TO WIN
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7 (2006).
2
Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487, 488 (1869).
3
Id.
4
For a general description of varying types of electronic signatures, which includes
digital signatures, public key cryptography, biometric devices, and smart cards, see
WARWICK FORD & MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997); SIMSON
GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURITY AND COMMERCE 187-208 (1997); JANE K.
WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 1.04[E] (4th ed.
2009).
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contracts entered into through electronic signatures.5 Since that time, forty-seven
states have also passed legislation making electronic signatures a legitimate and
streamlined aspect of the law.6
On June 22, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court dramatically expanded the
recognition and validity of electronic signatures in Anderson v. Bell.7 The court
held electronic signatures are legally effective and enforceable when qualifying a
candidate for the ballot under Utah’s Election Code. 8 Utah has a tradition of
treating electronic signatures progressively in the law; for example, it was the first
state in the nation to enact legislation designed to facilitate electronic transactions9
between parties with no prior business relationship.10 Furthering this tradition, the
court’s decision in Anderson placed Utah in the forefront of the merger between
technology, law, and democratic governance.
The decision has been hailed as “a huge step forward in recognizing the legal
efficacy of electronic signatures that may reverberate around the nation.” 11 The
incorporation of electronic signatures in election law would likely have a positive
impact on access and involvement in democratic participation, especially with
citizen-led initiatives and referenda.
Part II of this Note examines the laws surrounding electronic signatures,
including the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
(E-SIGN)12 and Utah’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (the UETA).13 This
section also discusses the novel application of electronic signatures in the area of
election law in the Utah Supreme Court’s Anderson decision.
Part III of this Note argues that the expansion of electronic signatures in
election law is a logical extension of E-SIGN and the UETA. Specifically, this
Note argues that the Utah Supreme Court’s application of electronic signatures in
qualifying a candidate for the ballot was proper. Part IV further advocates that
lawmakers should incorporate the use of electronic signatures into the election
5

See infra text accompanying notes 17–33.
See infra text accompanying notes 33–44.
7
234 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2010).
8
Id. at 1156.
9
At that time, the technology focused specifically on the use of “digital signatures”
rather than the broader use of an electronic signature discussed in this article. A digital
signature refers to the “specific authentication technology using asymmetric cryptography.”
Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under the Federal
E-Sign Legislation and the UETA, 56 BUS. LAW. 293, 295 (2000).
10
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-201 to -504 (LexisNexis 1998) (repealed 2006).
11
David K. Isom, Electronic Signatures Come of Age: From Elections to Commerce
and Beyond, INFO. L. GROUP (June 23, 2010), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2010/06/
articles/esignatures-1/electronic-signatures-come-of-age-from-elections-to-commerce-andbeyond/.
12
15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2006).
13
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to -503 (LexisNexis 2009); see also Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES [hereinafter UETA],
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/Uniform
ElectronicTransactionsActs/tabid/13484/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
6
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code wherever feasible. This section will also discuss the implications resulting
from the normalization of electronic signatures in election law, including an
argument that such normalizations will increase citizen participation in our
nation’s long-revered democratic processes. In particular, initiative and referendum
petitions would likely see increased use throughout the states. Part V concludes.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN THE LAW
While the law has long incorporated electronic signatures as legally effective
where hand-signed signatures are required, 14 some commentators believe the
electronic signature statutes of the last decade are “rare examples of law leading
technology.”15 Ever since the passage of federal and state uniform acts recognizing
the validity of electronic signatures, the “technology has been catching up to the
law.”16 To give context to the court’s decision in Anderson, this section examines
both the federal E-SIGN and Utah’s version, the UETA.
A. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
On June 30, 2000, President Clinton signed E-SIGN into law using a smart
card that allowed him to sign the bill through the use of an electronic signature.17
The legislation established the validity of electronic signatures for interstate and
international commerce where “a signature, contract, or other record relating to
such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely
because it is in electronic form . . . .”18 The act was designed to “place[] electronic
records and signatures on a legal par with their paper and ink counterparts.”19
E-SIGN defines an “electronic signature” as “an electronic sound, symbol or
process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.”20 Therefore, a
digital signature using public key infrastructure technology, a typed name, or a PIN
would qualify as a valid signature under the law.21 E-SIGN further specified that
electronic signatures are voluntary, as the Act does not “require any person to
agree to use or accept electronic records or electronic signatures.”22 To that effect,
14

See, e.g., Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 (1869) (recognizing electronic
signatures in the context of the telegraph).
15
Isom, supra note 11.
16
Id.
17
Dave Wreski, Clinton to E-SIGN Digital Signature Law, LINUXSECURITY.COM,
http://www.linuxsecurity.com/content/view/107946/169/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
18
15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1) (2006).
19
See Wittie & Winn, supra note 9, at 297.
20
15 U.S.C. § 7006(5) (2006).
21
See Susan H. Siegfried, The E-Commerce Revolution: E-SIGN and UETA (June
20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.simply-easier-acordforms.com/support-files/susansiegried.pdf [sic] (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
22
15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2).
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the legislation requires that consumers agree to the transactions that use electronic
signatures: “consumer disclosure” must be used to show that the consumer
“consent[s] electronically . . . in a manner that reasonably demonstrates that the
consumer can access information in the electronic form that will be used to provide
the information that is the subject of the consent.”23
The legislation also provides for the accuracy and availability of the electronic
record that is created. 24 Once a user enters an electronic signature, E-SIGN
specifies that for any “statute, regulation, or other rule of law requir[ing]” 25
retention of a document, the requirement can be met through “retaining an
electronic record” rather than a paper record.26 All parties must be given access to
the electronic record with the electronic signature.27 The record must be in a format
that is both accurate and accessible.28
Beyond these basic requirements, the legislation does not specify or endorse
any particular type of technology, allowing for continual software and hardware
development.29 This also provides greater flexibility and market competition for
individuals, companies, and agencies to choose the technology that best fits their
needs.30
E-SIGN also places some limits on electronic signatures. It excludes
application to wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, adoptions, divorces, other matters
of family law, or most sections of the Uniform Commercial Code.31 It also does
not apply to court orders, notices, official court documents, notice of the
cancellation of utilities, default, acceleration, or to foreclosures.32
Thus, E-SIGN establishes the legal efficacy of electronic signatures in federal
law and provides additional validation for the use of electronic signatures in
transactions. It also serves as the federal counterpart to state laws recognizing
electronic signatures.

23

Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(ii).
Id. § 7001.
25
Id. § 7001(c)(1).
26
Id. § 7001(d)(1).
27
Id. § 7001(d)(1)(B).
28
Id. § 7001(d)(1)(B).
29
Guidance on Implementing the Electronic Signatures in Global National
Commerce Act (E-SIGN), NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. 3–4, http://csrc.nist.gov/
drivers/documents/esign-guidance.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2012); see Siegfried, supra note
21.
30
See generally Siegfied, supra note 21.
31
15 U.S.C. § 7003(a). Specifically, the statute does not apply to sections 1-107, 1206, and Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. § 7003(a)(3).
32
Id. § 7003(b).
24
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B. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in Utah
The UETA was the result of a proposal by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.33 Like E-SIGN, the UETA provides “a
legal framework for the use of electronic signatures and records in government or
business transactions.”34 Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands have all adopted a uniform or modified version of the Act.35
While Illinois, New York, and Washington are the only states that have yet to
adopt some version of the UETA, all three states have passed other statutes
validating the use of electronic signatures in certain situations.36
States that have adopted the UETA have the authority to “modify, limit or
supersede some E-SIGN provisions, including its consumer protection
provisions.”37 This can be done so long as the statute does not favor a specific
technology and, if adopted after E-SIGN, where a state explicitly indicates an
intention to override the E-SIGN Act.38 Otherwise, E-SIGN will “govern[] in the
absence of a state law or where states have made modifications to the UETA that
are inconsistent with E-SIGN.”39
In 2000, the Utah Legislature enacted its own version of the UETA.40 Like the
provisions of E-SIGN, Utah’s UETA provides for a number of definitions
important to electronic signatures and electronic records.41 Additionally, the Utah
UETA specifies formatting requirements, record and check retention rules, rules
permitting electronic originals, rules on notarization, and rules for electronic
agents.42 The Utah UETA specifically excludes electronic signatures from wills,
codicils, testamentary trusts, and Articles 3 through 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.43 Additionally, it grants administrative agencies the authority to determine
when and if government documents will be filed electronically and permits
regulators to establish record retention requirements for mandatory records for

33

See UETA, supra note 13.
Id.
35
Id.; see also UNIF. ELECT. TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 1–21 (West 2010). For the
original draft version and commentary, see Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs of Unif. State
Laws, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (1999) [hereinafter NCCUSL], available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2012).
36
UETA, supra note 13; Electronic Commerce Security Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 175/5-105 (West 2005); Electronic Signature and Records Act, N.Y. STATE TECH
LAW § 301 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012); Electronic Authentication Act, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.34.010 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012).
37
See UETA, supra note 13.
38
See generally Wittie & Winn, supra note 9, at 324.
39
See UETA, supra note 13.
40
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to -503 (LexisNexis 2009).
41
Id. § 46-4-102.
42
Id. §§ 46-4-202 to -501.
43
Id. § 46-4-103.
34
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government inspection, review, or audit.44 Both E-SIGN and the UETA provide
the context and validity for the use of electronic signatures that underlie the Utah
Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Bell.
C. Anderson v. Bell
In 2010, Farley Anderson, a Utah resident, “entrepreneur, inventor, author,
publisher, teacher, lecturer, husband[,] and father of 11” began his independent
campaign to become the governor of Utah. 45 Under Utah’s Election Code, a
candidate not affiliated with a registered political party must collect the signatures
of 1,000 registered voters to run for governor.46 Mr. Anderson collected more than
the 1,000 required signatures in order to qualify his candidacy for governor of Utah
on the 2010 election ballot.47 However, not all of the signatures were hand-signed,
as many were gathered electronically through a campaign website.48
In compliance with the procedures outlined in the Utah Election Code, Mr.
Anderson submitted the signatures to county clerks for verification that each signer
was a registered voter and had not signed the petition for any other unaffiliated
candidate.49 Of the signatures submitted, clerks in seven counties certified 1,055
signatures as valid. 50 Armed with the requisite signatures and a completed
certificate of nomination, Mr. Anderson submitted his petition of candidacy on
March 19, 2010, to the Utah Lieutenant Governor’s Office.51
Lieutenant Governor Greg Bell took the position that electronic signatures do
not constitute a valid signature under the Utah Election Code and excised the
electronic signatures from Mr. Anderson’s nomination. 52 Subsequently, Bell
rejected Mr. Anderson’s candidacy for failing to obtain the required 1,000
signatures. 53 Mr. Anderson filed a petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah
Supreme Court arguing, among other things, that electronic signatures plainly
satisfy the requirements of the Utah Election Code. 54 Furthermore, the petition
alleged that Bell overstepped his authority in defining what constitutes a signature
subject to removal from a certificate of nomination.55
44

Id. §§ 46-4-501 to -503.
Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, VOTE.UTAH.GOV, 12, http://www.scribd.com/
doc/41938055/District-4 (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
46
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-502 (LexisNexis 2009).
47
Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2010).
48
Id. at 1148.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1149. The court declined to address Mr. Anderson’s other claims given their
“ultimate holding that an electronic signature satisfies the signature mandate imposed on
unaffiliated candidates.” Id.
55
Id.
45
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The court distilled the petition as asking “a single, distinctive question: what
is a ‘signature’ under [Utah’s Election Code]? Or more specifically, does an
electronic signature qualify as a valid signature under this statutory subsection?”56
From the outset, the court emphasized that the statutory language requires the court
to construe the framework covering unaffiliated candidates to give them “every
reasonable opportunity to make their candidacy effective.”57
The court noted that the Legislature had never defined the relevant terms of
“signature,” “signed,” or “completed” in the Utah Election Code.58 The court did
recognize, however, that there were “strong statutory indicators” elsewhere in the
Utah Code that a signature was not exclusive to a name or mark as written by a
person or at a person’s direction.59 Specifically, section 68-3-12—which outlines
the rules of construction as to words and phrases of the entire Utah Code—directs
courts to observe these definitions unless they would be “inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the Legislature” or “repugnant to the context of the statute.”60
Moreover, the court looked to section 68-3-12 in determining the definition of
the term “signature.”61 Under this section, this definition includes a “name, mark,
or sign written with the intent to authenticate any instrument or writing.” 62 The
Legislature defined “writing” to include “information stored in an electronic or
other medium if the information is retrievable in a perceivable format.”63 Taking
these definitions together, the court determined that electronic signatures were
explicitly contemplated by the Legislature under section 68-3-12.64
Central to the court’s decision was the recognition that the definitions of
“signature” and “writing” appeared to be far less concerned with the form of the
signature than they are concerned with the intent of the signer.65 This emphasis on
intent mirrors the importance that Utah courts have acknowledged in common
law. 66 The court also noted several secondary sources that provided indicia of
intent.67
56

Id. at 1150.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-501(3) (2007)).
58
Id. The Utah Election Code provides definitions, but does not include those terms.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-102 (LexisNexis 2009).
59
Id. at 1151–52.
60
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2008).
61
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1151–52.
62
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12.5(24).
63
Id. § 68-3-12.5(33).
64
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1152.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah 1983) (finding an imprinted
name of a judge made by a court clerk a “signature”); Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425 P.2d
773, 774 (Utah 1967) (discussing that it is the intent, rather than the form, of the act that is
important).
67
See, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. Contracts § 176 (2011) (stating that “a signature is
whatever mark, symbol, or device one may choose to employ to represent oneself, and may
include fingerprints. . . . ‘Electronic’ signatures are valid, and legislation has been enacted
specifically to authorize them” (footnotes omitted)); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1415 (8th
57
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The court then turned to Utah’s version of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act and its implication on the Election Code.68 The UETA defines an
electronic signature as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process . . . executed or
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.”69 Thus, the court reasoned
that once again, the statutory language indicates that the intent of the signer, rather
than the form, was the Legislature’s emphasis.70
The UETA is explicit about the use of electronic signatures: “[i]f a law
requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.”71 Mr. Anderson’s
argument relied on the proposition that this statute applies equally to other areas of
the Utah Code, including the Election Code.72 When the UETA was enacted, the
Utah Legislature enumerated a number of transactions that were excluded from the
UETA. 73 It did not, however, generally exclude the Election Code. Nor did it
specifically exclude campaigning, qualifying a candidate for the ballot, qualifying
a ballot proposition, the formation of a political party, or anything else regarding
the topic of elections. While observing that the omission does not qualify as a
“legislative endorsement,” the court found that the lack of a specific exclusion for
the Election Code was noteworthy. 74 The court concluded that UETA statutory
governs the use of “electronic signatures where its other requirements can be
satisfied.”75
The court’s analysis then shifted to refuting the arguments advanced by
Lieutenant Governor Bell. Though Mr. Anderson’s argument seemed to be a
logical interpretation of the statute, the lieutenant governor disputed this reading.
Lieutenant Governor Bell argued that certain subsections of the UETA were
designed to grant state agencies broad authority to choose whether or not to
conduct state business through electronic means and that forcing his office to
accept Mr. Anderson’s electronic signatures would violate the plain language of
those subsections.76 This argument relies on the following provision:
A state governmental agency may, by following the procedures and
requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act, make rules that: (a) identify specific transactions that the agency is
willing to conduct by electronic means; (b) identify specific transactions
that the agency will never conduct by electronic means . . . .77
ed. 2004) (defining a signature as “[a]ny name, mark, or writing used with the intention of
authenticating a document”).
68
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1152.
69
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-102(8) (LexisNexis 2005).
70
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1152.
71
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-201(4).
72
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1148.
73
UTAH CODE ANN. §46-4-202.
74
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1153.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-501(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2009).
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The court rejected Lieutenant Governor Bell’s contention that allowing Mr.
Anderson’s candidacy would “force his office, in contravention of the plain
language of [the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act], to permit the use of
electronic signatures.”78
The court noted that Lieutenant Governor Bell had “done nothing to
promulgate rules for electronic records” under the rulemaking procedures required
by Title 63G.79 As the court recognized, holding otherwise would disregard the
rulemaking component of the statute.80 Such a reading would establish precedent
that anytime a state agency had not promulgated rules regarding electronic
signatures, the agency, by default, would not conduct business through electronic
means. The court emphasized that the rulemaking requirement was “critical” to
prevent “informal decisions” made on a case-by-case basis.81
The court acknowledged that Lieutenant Governor Bell’s second argument—
claiming subsection 46-4-501(4), which controls the creation and retention of
electronic records and conversion of written records by governmental agencies, as
expressly allowing his office to refuse Mr. Anderson’s certificate of nomination—
was “plausible,” if read in isolation.82 Subsection 4 specifies that “nothing in this
chapter requires any state governmental agency to: (a) conduct transactions by
electronic means; or (b) use or permit the use of electronic records or electronic
signatures.”83
Nonetheless, the court rejected this reading of the statute. The court found that
Lieutenant Governor Bell’s contention “loses its persuasive effect” when
“harmoniz[ing] this subsection with the rest of section 46-4-501, the remainder of
the UETA, [the Utah Code’s rules of statutory construction], and the Election
Code.” 84 To construe subsection 46-4-501(4) in the manner that Bell advanced
would expressly contradict the UETA for several reasons. 85 First, the UETA
expressly permits any law requiring a signature to be satisfied by an electronic
signature.86 Second, the UETA mandates that an electronic signature “may not be
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”87
The court also noted that the UETA requires the Act “be construed and
applied: (1) to facilitate electronic transactions” and “(2) to be consistent with
reasonable practices concerning electronic transactions and with the continued
78

Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1154.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-501(4) (LexisNexis 2009).
84
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1154 (citing Sill v. Hart, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Utah 2007))
(stating that part of the court’s attempt to determine a statute’s plain language is to construe
the statute at issue “with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole”).
85
Id. at 1154–55.
86
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-201(4).
87
Id. § 46-4-201(1).
79
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expansion of those practices.” 88 A “transaction” is “an action or set of actions
occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business,
commercial, or governmental affairs.”89
Lieutenant Governor Bell argued that Mr. Anderson’s method of acquiring
signatures did not qualify as a transaction as defined under the UETA.90 The court
recognized, however, that Lieutenant Governor Bell’s position accomplishes just
the opposite, “curb[ing] electronic transactions rather than facilitat[ing] them.” 91
Beyond the narrow exceptions enumerated by the Utah Legislature, the court found
that the UETA, by implication, is not excluded in its applications from a range of
transactions.92
The lieutenant governor also argued that as the chief election officer for Utah,
he is a “party” to the signing transaction and must agree to the use of electronic
signatures.93 This argument rests on the UETA’s application “only to transactions
between parties each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic
means.”94 The court was not persuaded, noting, “the would-be candidate circulates
a petition for nomination to registered voters.”95 Because a petition for nomination
is submitted to country clerks for verification only after the petition is “completed
by” 1,000 registered voters,96 the court read the term “completed” to mean that the
“transaction” had already closed.97
The UETA defines a “transaction” as “an action or set of actions occurring
between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or
governmental affairs.” 98 The court reasoned that “treating the transaction as
between the circulating nominee and the signer makes the most logical sense; it is
an authentication that the signee supports the circulator’s bid to have his name on
the ballot as a candidate for statewide office.”99 Therefore, the court rejected the
argument that including the lieutenant governor as a party would impact the
transaction or the authentication of a signer’s support.100
The court then took time to address the lieutenant governor’s argument that
electronic signatures are more susceptible to fraud and should not be given the
level of credence that paper signatures would be. The court noted:

88

Id. § 46-4-106.
Id.
90
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155.
91
Id. at 1154–55.
92
Id. at 1155.
93
Id.
94
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-105(2)(a).
95
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155 (emphasis added).
96
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-502(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
97
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155.
98
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-102(16) (LexisNexis 2005).
99
Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1155.
100
Id.
89
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The Lt. Governor . . . contends that electronic signatures attached to
a certificate of nomination lack “apparent authority” as genuine
signatures. This position is based on a theory that a holographic signature
is self-authenticating because the reviewing party may merely look at the
signature and see that someone put pen to paper to sign [his or her]
name. In contrast, an electronic signature lacks apparent authority,
because it appears as a typed list of names. . . . We are unpersuaded that
an electronic signature presents special concerns regarding candidate
fraud; a candidate could as easily handwrite or type fraudulent names
onto a certificate of nomination.101
The court also recognized that “electronic signatures may be a better deterrent to
candidate fraud because an electronic signature incorporates readily verifiable
personal, but not-public, information.” 102 As an example, the court noted “the
signers of Mr. Anderson’s petition apparently had to enter a security code that
corresponds to the last four digits of their driver’s license number before their
signature would be counted.”103
The court concluded by holding that Lieutenant Governor Bell exceeded his
authority as Utah’s chief election officer when he “excised the electronic
signatures attached to Mr. Anderson’s certificate of nomination.” 104 The court
granted Mr. Anderson his writ of extraordinary relief and instructed the lieutenant
governor to recount the signatures submitted by Mr. Anderson.105 Subsequently,
Mr. Anderson was placed on the 2010 ballot as a candidate for Utah Governor,
losing the election with 11,842 votes, or only 1.99%.106
In 2011, the Utah Legislature viscerally reacted to the Utah Supreme Court’s
holding in Anderson. The Utah Legislature amended the Election Code to prohibit
electronic signatures. 107 Additionally, the Legislature specified that holographic
signatures alone are sufficient for Utah election purposes. 108 These changes not
only abolished the holding in Anderson but also eliminated any chance that
electronic signatures could be used for the other election procedures, such as
organizing a political party or putting forward citizen-led initiatives or referenda.

101

Id. at 1155 n.7.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1156.
105
Id.
106
Utah
Election
Results:
Governor/Lt
Governor,
UTAH.GOV,
http://electionresults.utah.gov/xmlData/300080.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
107
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-306 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); see also S.B. 165
Second Substitute, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011), available at http://www.le.utah.gov/
~2011/bills/sbillenr/sb0165.pdf.
108
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D. Utah Should Incorporate Electronic Signatures into the Election Code
For reasons discussed below, the Utah Legislature should reconsider its
reactionary measures undercutting the Anderson decision and once again make
Utah a leader in embracing the legitimate and logical use of electronic signatures
in the law. Through Anderson, Utah became the first state to recognize the use of
electronic “transactions” in the context of election law by allowing electronic
signatures to qualify Mr. Anderson for the ballot. 109 Reading Utah’s UETA as
permitting and encouraging electronic signatures outside of traditional business
transactions is novel. 110 The Anderson decision should serve as the basis for a
broader trend among the states in recognizing the validity of electronic signatures
in election law where a signer would otherwise physically handle a piece of paper
and sign his or her name with a pen.
III. THE LOGICAL EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN ELECTION LAW
The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning in Anderson is sound. The UETA
“applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction.”111
The language stating that where the law “requires a signature, an electronic
signature satisfies the law” could not be more straightforward. 112 The UETA
dictates that it “be construed and applied: (1) to facilitate electronic transactions”
and “(2) to be consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic
transactions and with the continued expansion of those practices.”113
Thus, when applied to various election law contexts—such as qualifying
independent candidates for the ballot, petitions to organize and register political
parties, and qualifying ballot propositions such as recalls, initiatives, and
referenda—a legitimate “transaction” between petitioners and signatories is
formed. In all of these situations, the signing and submitting electronic signatures
to the government for authentication constitutes a completed “transaction” because
it is “an action . . . between two or more persons relating to the conduct of . . .
governmental affairs.”114
States should encourage their regulatory agencies and governmental
departments to use electronic signatures and documents where feasible. Many
areas of the law could benefit from the convenience and cost savings associated
with using electronic signatures and electronic records rather than their paper
counterparts. These benefits include saving time through the elimination of
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signing, scanning, faxing, and mailing.115 Additionally, electronic signatures and
records reduce waiting time where a transaction can be completed in seconds.116
Electronic signatures also reduce the costs of paper, ink, and postage. 117
Additionally, all parties immediately receive a copy of the transaction, making it
easier to file and refer to later.118 Additionally, many electronic signature services
include archiving ability to store the documents in one easily accessible location.119
Finally, electronic signatures allow for digital encryptions that provide an
increased level of security against fraud.120
One expert believes that the court’s analysis in Anderson will persuade others
to embrace electronic signatures on a broader scale, noting, “companies and
individuals have been slow to implement the available . . . legislation aimed at
encouraging and validating electronic commerce and electronic signatures.” 121
Given the advancements of technology and validation evidenced by Anderson,
states that have adopted the UETA should add language strongly encouraging or
requiring agencies to use electronic signatures and electronic records. Congress
and the president should encourage the same for federal agencies.
The use of electronic signatures can find particular application to the Election
Code. Such a reading is consistent with the UETA’s purpose of facilitating
electronic transactions and encouraging technology developments relating to
electronic signatures. 122 The validity of using an electronic signature to sign a
petition as a “transaction” between the government and its citizenry to recall a
wayward politician should be no less legitimate than when a “transaction” for a
major purchase with a credit card or when electronically committing to a milliondollar contract. Other states should embrace their roles as “laboratories of
democracy” and follow Utah’s lead in recognizing that electronic signatures are a
valid “transaction” within the context of election law.123
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One commentator criticized the Anderson decision for creating unintended
consequences and “a Pandora’s box of election law issues.”124 But legislators can
easily review their state’s election code to ensure that there is a fair and orderly
process to accommodate independent candidates capable of creating web-based
campaigns validated entirely by electronic signatures.
Nor is fraud a realistic concern.125 A candidate who produces a typed list of
fraudulent names of electronic signatures could just as easily hand-write fraudulent
names onto a petition or certificate of nomination. In fact, electronic signatures
may be a better deterrent to this type of election fraud. The Anderson opinion
provides such an example: signers were prompted to enter a security code
corresponding to the last four digits of their driver’s license number before their
signature would be included in the petition.126
These considerations are not legitimate excuses to slow the inevitable
acceptance of technology in the law, particularly in the context of election law.
Legislatures should avoid any confusion by preempting judicial recognition of the
validity of electronic signatures and conform their Election Codes to their state’s
UETA. Doing so would prevent costly litigation and preserve state resources.
The logical inferences of the court’s holding in Anderson would permit the
use of an electronic signature into other areas of the Election Code requiring a
signature. There is no compelling reason that an electronic signature should be any
less valid when qualifying a candidate for the ballot than for signing a petition to
organize and register a political party or to qualify a citizen-driven referendum or
initiative for the ballot. Other states should recognize that a UETA “transaction”
applies in the context of election law.
IV. EXPANDING ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN ELECTION LAW WOULD LEAD
TO GREATER VOTER PARTICIPATION AND DISCOURSE
By following the Utah Supreme Court’s lead, other states would benefit from
increased citizen access to elections and self-governance, particularly involving the
formation of political parties, initiatives, and referenda. As the American Civil
Liberty Union of Utah noted, the Anderson decision has “the potential to
significantly increase the ability of independent candidates to access the general
124
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election ballot, and thus to increase the opportunity for minority viewpoints in
Utah to be heard and considered in election years.” 127 The implications extend
beyond minority viewpoints, however, as a majority of voters may be inclined to
pass an initiative or referendum.128
Internet access and usage has exploded in the past decade.129 In 2000, 46% of
adults used the Internet compared with 79% in 2010.130 The use of broadband in
the home jumped from 5% to 64% during the same time.131 Less than 1% of adults
connected wirelessly in 2000, compared to 58% in 2010.132 With such increases in
the use of electronic resources, it is unsurprising that the Internet has readily been
incorporated into politics and elections.133
An initiative is “the process whereby citizens can adopt laws or amend [a]
state constitution.”134 In order to succeed in placing a direct initiative on the ballot
in Utah, proponents must gather signatures equal to 10% of the total votes cast in
the last gubernatorial election.135 A direct initiative goes directly to the ballot, as
opposed to an indirect initiative, which requires 5% of the total votes cast in the
last gubernatorial election to be submitted to the Legislature for approval or
rejection.136
Popular referendum is the “process whereby citizens have the ability to send
legislation passed by the legislature to a vote of the people to either accept or
reject.”137 A referendum also requires that proponents gather signatures equal to
10% of the total votes cast in the last gubernatorial election from around the
state.138
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The number of citizens engaging in direct democracy through initiatives and
referenda is increasing in states that allow their use. 139 Access to technology is
changing the way people become informed and involved in the political process,
based largely on access to information and opinions on public policy.140 The use of
electronic signatures in election law increases the ability of a democratic society to
engage its elected representatives and take part in crafting public policy. The most
rewarding prospects of expanding the use of electronic signatures into other
aspects of the election code would come from increased participation by the public
in representing their own interests. For example, this could be done through a
popular movement’s formation into a new political party.141 The ease of signing an
online petition for a particular cause would allow otherwise disenfranchised and
poorly funded groups to come together and utilize the basic democratic tools
available to the American citizenry.
The ability for a citizenry to use electronic signatures would dramatically
increase access to initiatives and referenda. 142 This will “make the will of the
people law on issues that elected officials are unwilling to address.” 143 These
opportunities of direct democracy could also provide “an effective check on [the]
perceived influence by special interest groups” on elected officials who “are
particularly susceptible to special interests and their financial influence.”144
Thus, in the age of the Internet and blogosphere politics, the citizenry has
more opportunities to ensure responsive representation. But when those elected
officials fail to respond to the cries of the electorate, the people can harness the
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expanding use of innovation and technology through electronic signatures, in order
to enact or repeal laws for their own self-governance.
The Utah Legislature should reconsider its post-Anderson reactionary
legislation and allow for the expansion of electronic signatures in the Utah Election
Code, once again making Utah a leader in embracing the legitimate and logical use
of electronic signatures in the law.
V. CONCLUSION
Electronic signatures have become increasingly accepted in the law, but even
so, validation and legitimacy come slowly. Congress and the various states have
taken substantial steps to create uniform standards for electronic records and
signatures through the passage of legislation like E-SIGN and UETA.145
But as the Utah Supreme Court observed, there are other valid “transactions”
in the law where these statutes should apply.146 In Anderson v. Bell, it applied to an
independent candidate’s ballot qualification. 147 The Utah Legislature disagreed,
however, and amended the Utah Election Code to exclude electronic signatures.148
This Note advocates expanding the reach of an electronic signature into other
areas of election law. This includes instances involving qualifying independent
candidates for the ballot; petitions to organize and register political parties; and
qualifying ballot propositions such as recalls, initiatives, and referenda. 149 This
expansion of electronic signatures would increase the involvement of the electorate
through the efficiency, ease, and reliability associated with the use of electronic
signatures in election law. 150 The use of electronic signatures in election law
increases the ability of a democratic society to directly participate in crafting
public policy and engage elected representatives.
The Utah Legislature should reconsider its actions and apply the UETA to the
Utah Election Code as a logical and worthwhile expansion of electronic signatures
in the law. The inevitable march of technology will carry on. Electronic signatures
should not be limited to commercial and business transactions but should apply to
election codes where a physical signature has traditionally been required. The Utah
Legislature should reclaim Utah’s historic place as a leader151 of expanding the use
of electronic signatures in the law.
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